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 ANTICIPATION EFFECTS IN ENDOGENOUS
PROBABILITY-MIGRATION MODELS
M. GARC ¸ON, J. GARNIER, AND A. OMRANE
Abstract. We analyze a probability-migration model based on the thresh-
old of average human capital as in H.-J. Chen [1]. The di cult and inter-
esting case is the one where the probability of migration is dependent on
current average human capital (the anticipative case). Here, indetermi-
nacy occurs, and one has to study a lot of subcases. In the present article
we deeply study new interesting cases and we give a global answer.
1. Introduction
The probability of migration on the economic growth of a developing country
is an essential factor, since that people living in a source country with higher
average human capital are traditionally more incited to emigrate in the future
to a foreign country than those living in a source country with lower average
human capital.
By endogenizing the probability of migration, a lot of authors (see Chen [1],
Vidal [6] an the references therein) found that there is a possibility of club
convergence occurring in the short run, and conditional convergence occurring
in the long run following the two following possible scenarios:
The ﬁrst scenario is when the probability of migration is dependent on prior
average human capital; we will call it in this paper the traditional case. Here,
the threshold level will a ect economic behavior in the long run. Thus, if
the average human capital threshold is su ciently low (respectively high), the
economy will converge to a high (respectively low) steady state level. However,
if the average human capital threshold is at the median level, club convergence
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may occur and the initial condition matters.
In the second scenario, the probability of migration can dependent on current
average human capital (we will call it the anticipative case). Here, the dynamic
transition of the economy will be determined by perceptions of the future. In
[1] it is found that a belief in the higher probability of migration in the future
will provide an incentive for agents to invest more in their education, thereby
raising their accumulation of human capital, which will in turn lead to a higher
probability of migration indicating that the problem can be a source of inde-
terminacy.
Our study demonstrates that migration can be used to explain some impor-
tant economic growth phenomena, with the two scenarios considered in this
paper contributing to two distinct lines of research in the literature on eco-
nomic growth. The occurrence of multiple steady states in the ﬁrst scenario
can help to explain the ﬁndings of club convergence in the empirical studies.
The second scenario indicates that migration can be a source of indeter-
minacy, and therefore emphasizes the role of beliefs. This implies that when
embracing migration, economies with similar backgrounds may well follow dif-
ferent equilibrium paths simply because they have di erent beliefs about their
future probability of migration.
We here give a more precise analysis.
2. Position of the problem
In a small open economy characterized by an inﬁnite horizon, Chen [1] con-
siders a no-growth overlapping generations model, where agents live for two
successive periods. In each period a new generation is born, agents born in
period t are endowed with parental human capital ht, and are supposed to
allocate their time between gaining education et and engaging in leisure 1 et
in the ﬁrst period of life. In the second period, agents can migrate to a foreign
country (country B) with probability pt+1   [0,1] or remain into the home
country (country A) with probability 1   pt+1. During this second period of
life, agents spend all of their time working to earn income for consumption.
Moreover, if wA and wB represent the respective real wage per unit of hu-
man capital in countries A and B, the earnings of agents are equal to theirANTICIPATION EFFECTS IN ENDOGENOUS PROBABILITY-MIGRATION MODELS 3
level of human capital ht+1 multiplied by the real wage per unit of human cap-
ital of the country in which they live. That is, the expected utility function,
which is identical for all agents, is deﬁned for  > 0 and  > 1 by:
(1) ut = ln(1   et)+  [(1   pt+1)ln(wAht+1)+pt+1  ln(wBht+1)].
As in [1], from period t to period t+1 the human capital evolves following the
relation




t,  ,    (0,1).
We distinguish two migration processes: the traditional process of migration
where the probability of migration is deﬁned as pt+1 = P(ht) and the anticipa-
tive one given by P(ht+1), where P is an increasing function. In the traditional
process the probability of migration of the young adults pt+1 is determined by
the human capital of the parents ht. In the anticipative process the probability
of migration of the young adults pt+1 is determined by the human capital of the
young adults at the end of their ﬁrst period ht+1. As we will see indeterminacy
can occur in this anticipative situation, since the time spent in education et,
and therefore the human capital of the young adults at the end of their ﬁrst
period ht+1, then depend on the probability of mutation pt+1. Indeed, the
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and the optimal decision of e 
t which is reached at ( ut)/( et) = 0 is given by
(4) e 
t =
  [1 + (    1)pt+1]
1+  [1 + (    1)pt+1]
.
2.1. The traditional model. The probability of migration is assumed to be
dependent on average human capital Ht. We suppose that the agents are
homogeneous, then the average human capital is equal to the personal human
capital in each period Ht = ht. In this subsection, we consider the traditional
model of migration, that is:
(5) pt+1 = P(ht)4 M. GARC ¸ON, J. GARNIER, AND A. OMRANE
which means that the probability of migration is dependent on average human
capital lagged by one period (i.e. the average human capital of the parents).
We also suppose that
(6) P(h)=
 
p1 if h < h#
p2 if h   h#
for some probability constants 0   p1 <p 2   1, where h# is a nominative
threshold human capital as in [1]. For j =1 ,2, we ﬁnally denote by
(7) ej =
  [1 + (    1)pj]
1+  [1 + (    1)pj]
.
Note that we have e1 <e 2.
Proposition 1. The sequence of human capitals (ht)t converge to a ﬁxed
point.
The two possible ﬁxed points are ¯ h1 and ¯ h2 (with ¯ h1 < ¯ h2) deﬁned by






1   ,j =1 ,2.
We have the following:
- If ¯ h1 >h #, then the sequence (ht)t converges to ¯ h2 for every h0.
- If ¯ h2 <h #, then the sequence (ht)t converges to ¯ h1 for every h0.
- If ¯ h1 <h # < ¯ h2, then
(a) if h0 <h #, the sequence (ht)t converges to ¯ h1,
(b) if h0 >h #, the sequence (ht)t converges to ¯ h2.











t if ht   h#.
We obtain the two ﬁxed points ¯ h1 and ¯ h2 given by (8).
  Case ¯ h1 >h #: here, an economy with low initial human capital h0 <h # will
ﬁrst converge towards h#, then it jumps for converging to the highest econ-
omy ¯ h2 (the only ﬁxed point), and an economy with high initial human capital
h0 >h # will naturally converge to ¯ h2.
  In the case ¯ h2 <h # (i.e case where h# is high), the economy will converge
to the smallest steady state ¯ h1 regardless of its initial condition.
  In the case ¯ h1 <h # < ¯ h2, we obtain the two scenarios (a) where the economy
will converge to the smallest steady state (underdevelopment trap) ¯ h1, and inANTICIPATION EFFECTS IN ENDOGENOUS PROBABILITY-MIGRATION MODELS 5
the scenario (b) the economy will converge to a highest economy ¯ h2.
Remark 2. With this traditional migration model (i.e when the probability
of migration is dependent on the human capital of the parents), the human
capital threshold h# determines the growth of the economy which will converge
to one of the two ﬁxed points ¯ h1 and ¯ h2 given by (8).
3. The main result
3.1. The anticipative model. In this section we assume that the probability
of migration is dependent on the average human capital in period t+1 (see [1]
and also the work by Cipriani et al. [3]). Here, the dynamics of human capital
are dependent on households perceptions and beliefs about the future:
(10) pt+1 = P(ht+1)































Note that we have h#
o <h #
p .
The equation (11) is implicit and, given the value ht, there may be several
possible values for ht+1. We have the:
Lemma 3. Let ht be the human capital at period t. The human capital
ht+1 at period t +1must satisfy equation (11). Then we have the following:
1) If ht <h
#




2) If ht >h #




Lemma 4. The following inequality is satisﬁed:
(13) e
 (  1)
1 e




#   1
<e
   
1 e
 (  1)
2
if and only if
(14) [0,h #
o ) and (h#
p ,+ ) are stable6 M. GARC ¸ON, J. GARNIER, AND A. OMRANE
if and only if
(15) ¯ h1   [0,h
#
o ) and ¯ h2   (h
#
p ,+ ).
Proposition 5. Under the hypothesis (13), we have the following asser-
tions:
(1) If h0 <h #
o then the sequence (ht)t converges to the ﬁxed point ¯ h1.
(2) If h0 >h #
p then the sequence (ht)t converges to the ﬁxed point ¯ h2.
Lemma 6. Let ht be the human capital at period t. Then, if h#
o <h t <h #
p
there exist two di erent possible values:
(16) ht+1,j = Ae
 
j h 
t for j =1 ,2.
Remark 7. The proof of Proposition 5 will be given in the Appendix.











h# then we obtain the two solutions deﬁned
by (16). The lemma shows that it is necessary to give a mechanism to select
between the two possible solutions for ht+1 in the case in which h#
o <h t <h #
p .
We will address di erent selection mechanisms in Subsection 3.2 and Subsection
3.3 below.
3.2. Optimistic and pessimistic selection mechanisms. The pessimistic
selection mechanism consists in choosing the smallest possible value for the
human capital when there are two possible choices. The optimistic selection
mechanism consists in choosing the largest possible value for the human capital
when there are two possible choices. These are the two extremal selection
mechanisms. We will consider an intermediate mechanism later in Subsection
3.3.
The following proposition gives the main result in the case of the two selec-
tion mechanisms.
Proposition 8. Under the hypothesis (13), we have the following asser-
tions:
(1) With the pessimistic selection mechanism, the sequence (ht)t converges to
the ﬁxed point ¯ h1 if h0 <h #
p , and converges to the ﬁxed point ¯ h2 if h0 >h #
p .
(2) with the optimistic selection mechanism, the sequence (ht)t converges to
the ﬁxed point ¯ h1 if h0 <h #
o , and converges to the ﬁxed point ¯ h2 if h0 >h #
o .ANTICIPATION EFFECTS IN ENDOGENOUS PROBABILITY-MIGRATION MODELS 7
Proof - Indeed, for j =1 ,2, the ﬁxed point ¯ hj satisﬁes to ¯ hj = Ae
 
j(¯ hj) 



















 . So in this case ht+1 = Ae
 
1h 
t converges to a unique ¯ h1.






 , then the sequence (ht)t converges to ¯ h2. With the
















3.3. Conservative selection mechanism. We still use the hypothesis (13).
The conservative selection mechanism consists in choosing for the human cap-











We have the following result:
Proposition 9. Under the hypothesis (13), with the conservative selection
mechanism, the sequence (ht)t converges to the ﬁxed point ¯ h1 (resp. ¯ h2) i 
h0 <H(resp. h0 >H) where we have:




















Discussion. The threshold value in the traditional case is h#. In the
anticipative case with the optimistic (resp. pessimistic) selection mechanism it
is h#
o (resp. h#







In the goal to have a high economy level, we notice that the optimistic anticipa-
tion mechanism is the one that gives the smallest threshold value H from which
we have convergence to the highest ﬁxed point ¯ h2. Conversely, the pessimistic
anticipation mechanism is the one that gives the largest threshold value.
3.4. Conclusion. It is worthwhile to note that, whatever the type of evolu-
tion equation for the human capital (traditional or anticipative) and for any
selection mechanisms, the result can always be expressed by an assertion of8 M. GARC ¸ON, J. GARNIER, AND A. OMRANE
the type: if the initial capital h0 is smaller than a threshold value H, then the
human capital will converge to the low ﬁxed point ¯ h1, while if the initial capital
h0 is larger than a threshold value H, then the human capital will converge
to the high ﬁxed point ¯ h2. The values of the ﬁxed points ¯ h1 and ¯ h2 do not
depend on the type of evolution equation and of the selection mechanism. Only
the threshold value H depends on the type of evolution equation and of the
selection mechanism.
4. Appendix - Complementary results
Proof or Proposition 5: The ﬁrst interesting remark is that the two new
thresholds satisfy to h#
o <h # <h #
p where h# is the human capital threshold of
the traditional case in the previous section. We will comment this remark at the
end of the paper. In particular, it is interesting to know what happens if we do
not satisfy (13). We will address the two other cases e
 (  1)
1 e
   
2 >A
 
h#   1
and A
 
h#   1
>e
   
1 e
 (  1)
2 in [4].




t . If the average human capital ht at period t is lower than the
threshold h#











t which will be the lower economy at which we will certainly con-
verge. Similar argument can be used to justify the case 2).
Stability: The question is stating with average initial human capital h0 in one
of the two intervals w.r.t (14), do we remain in the same interval-region (lower
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2 > 1, which is obviously true since that we have A<
 























































1. But this is equiva-
lent to A>
 















h# 1  
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1 e
 (  1)
2 . In conclusion, the economy surely converges to a
steady in the important case of (13). We ﬁnally notice the equvalence of (13)ANTICIPATION EFFECTS IN ENDOGENOUS PROBABILITY-MIGRATION MODELS 9
with (14) as we have
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we have the following two assertions:




0, then we have








0, then we have convergence to the




Proof - We suppose (19) true, then we have the two cases:
(1) Given h0, if h1 = Ae
 
1h 
0, the question is: do we still have h1 <h 0?
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we ﬁnd h0 <h 1 and then we have the convergence to the unique ﬁxed




Lemma 11. We suppose that the hypothesis (13) is satisﬁed. Then we
have the two following assertions:
(a) If h0 >h #
c , then the solution given by ht+1 = Ae
 
2h 
t is the one of minimal
norm:  ht+1   h0  = min. Moreover, this solution converges to the unique
ﬁxed point ¯ h2.10 M. GARC ¸ON, J. GARNIER, AND A. OMRANE
(b) If h#
c >h 0, then  ht+1   h0  = min, and moreover (ht)t converges to the
unique ﬁxed point ¯ h1.
Proof - Suppose that (13) holds. There is two di erent possibilities for
the ﬁrst step: h1,1 = Ae
 
1h 
0 and h1,2 = Ae
 
2h 
0. From Lemma 10 we have



















  2h0   h1,1   h1,2 > 0
that is h0   h1,1 >h 1,2   h0. So h1,2 is the closest to h0. We easily generalize
to any t. We do the same analysis for (b).
Remark 12. We have to be sure that the set of possible solutions in
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which is still true i 
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X1     1
is non negative, which is obviously true.
References
[1] Chen H.-J. The endogenous probability of migration and economic growth, Economic
Modelling, 25, pp 1111–1115 (2008).
[2] Chen H.-J. International migration and economic growth: a source country perspective.
Journal of Population Economics 19, 725-748 (2006).
[3] Cipriani G.P., Makris M. A model with self-fulﬁlling prophecies of longevity. Econom-
ics Letters 91, 122-126 (2006).ANTICIPATION EFFECTS IN ENDOGENOUS PROBABILITY-MIGRATION MODELS 11
[4] Garc ¸on M. Analyse math´ ematique et ´ economique des probl` emes de ﬂux migratoires,
Universit´ e des Antilles et de la Guyane, Phd Thesis (to appear).
[5] Garc ¸on M., Garnier J., Omrane A. To appear.
[6] Vidal J.-P. The E ect of Emigration on Human Capital Formation. Journal of Popu-
lation Economics 11, pp 589-600 (1998).
Centre d’´ etude et de Recherche en ´ economie, Gestion, Mod´ elisation et Infor-
matique appliqu´ ee (CEREGMIA-EA 2440), Universit´ e des Antilles et de la Guyane,
Campus de Fouillole, 97159 Pointe ` a Pitre, Guadeloupe (France)
E-mail address: manuel.garcon@gmail.com
Laboratoire de Probabilit´ es et Mod` eles Al´ eatoires & Laboratoire Jacques-
Louis Lions, University of Paris VII, 2 Place Jussieu, 75251 Paris Cedex 5 (France)
E-mail address: garnier@math.jussieu.fr
Centre d’´ etude et de Recherche en ´ economie, Gestion, Mod´ elisation et Infor-
matique appliqu´ ee (CEREGMIA-EA 2440), Universit´ e des Antilles et de la Guyane,
Campus de Fouillole, 97159 Pointe ` a Pitre, Guadeloupe (France)
E-mail address: aomrane@univ-ag.fr